Committee on Resources
Subcommittee on Forests & Forest Health

Statement

The "Once" And "Future" Forest Service
Testimony of
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Madame Chairwoman and Committee Members:

Here are my thoughts about the "Once Forest Service" and a guess about the "Future Forest Service".

The "Once" Forest Service

I have no desire to go back to "the good old days". I enjoyed them. A little nostalgia is fine for old guys like me. The present has challenges. The future belongs to those who follow us. Hopefully the past offers this generation lessons and new vistas of knowledge will help chart a wise course.

Forest conservation in the late 1800's was driven by the view that it was prudent and profitable. Denuded landscapes, deserted logging towns, and huge slash fires then the timber industry hallmark, did not have to be. In the low rainfall West, there was a concern that mountains be a protected source of vital water for irrigation agriculture.

The 1891 Reserve Act was a rider tacked on a bill in Conference. Its existence was denied when the report reached the House. In the minds of the proponents reserving some public land from entry was justified by WATER. The initial Reserve was 1,200,000 public domain acres; by 1910 5 Presidents had reserved 172,000,000 acres. Half of the land was treeless. "Forests" became the focus due to the key roles of Sargent, Fernow and Pinchot. From 1910 to 1927 18,000,000 acres were removed under claims that they were needed for Western agriculture. It wasn't until 1938, using Weeks Act exchanges and land purchases which were fueled by the Depression that the System reached 172,000,000 acres again. Much excluded land came back, denuded, as farms failed. Most of the additions were purchases, at about $2.00/acre, from firms that had liquidated timber from public land they had earlier acquired by questionable means. A combination of straight exchanges, "stumps for stumpage" exchanges with timber companies that had cut out lands within the Forests, brought the System to 180,000,000 acres by 1960.

Current debates forget that from the start - and today - 49,463,000 acres, barely 25% of the System land is rated "Suitable For Timber Production", a term with no clue whether management may recover costs. Also

disregarded is that the System is 75% treeless high mountain country, range and woodland.

Grazing is a major annual land use of 50,000,000 acres. Even in the peak timber years since WW II only 1.1 million acres were logged annually. Grazing fees were always low. Still from 1906-1920 grazing outgrossed timber; $19 million to only $17.4 million for timber.

Until WW II the annual National Forest cut seldom reached 1 billion board feet. Wild fire was a continual major problem. Insects and disease went largely unchecked. If you went back to that past to recreate the System in that image, it'd be far from what many imagine when they pine for "the good old days".

How Did Forestry Become The Center of Attention Focused On The By The Forest Service When So Much Of Its Land Is Treeless?

We owe this to Gifford Pinchot. When the Reserves were transferred to Agriculture in 1905 he renamed the agency the "Forest Service" and the lands the "National Forests."

The Notion That Public Forest Management Is Profitable Also Has Roots Pinchot Planted.

In 1890 Gifford Pinchot recounts that when studying forestry in France, Prof. Lucien Boppe told him,

> "When you get home to America you must manage a forest and make it pay."

In 1947, recalling his time as Chief, Pinchot wrote that he

> "never lost sight of [that] advice." [Breaking New Ground, page 10]

On his 1896 work with Sargent he said of a Montana Reserve that,

> "...the chief argument...was its fitness for prompt and paying forest management." [ibid @ 96]

Pinchot held that his New England study proved that cutting

> "... stunted..malformed trees...pays" [1901 Sen. Doc. 6 57th Cong. 1st Sess, @ 328].

The myth that "Salvage" is cost effective was born then. Evidence that salvage sales lose money and more often add to site damage are contested. This is from those who think "denial" is a river that runs through Egypt.

From 1899 through 1904 timber receipts from the Reserves totaled only $203,000 while cost ran $1,689,000 a loss of -$1,486,000. Grazing was free and unregulated. Pinchot used making a profit to have the "Reserves" moved to Agriculture.

The 1902 "TR" transfer bill failed when Cong. Joe Cannon, then Chair of Appropriations and Cong. Mondell of WY forced its recommittal. Cannon said Pinchot was a "wild spender". Mondell said Pinchot would make the Reserves an Eastern elite hunting preserve.

When "TR" was elected in his own right, the revived bill was quickly passed in February 1905 without debate or opposition.

Pinchot's 1907 Appropriation bill testimony reveals how he overcame the opposition of Cannon and Mondell. He had promised that if allowed to retain receipts and get $1,000,000 yearly from Congress he'd show a profit by 1910. [59 Cong. 2nd Sess. H. Agric.Com. Hng. on Exp. 1907 p 791]

At the same time Pinchot stressed his twin goals (1) educate private forest owners, and (2) use the Forests to show that forestry is "a paying proposition". He solemnly declared, "We recommend no cutting that does not pay for itself." (ibid @ 783)

Your earlier hearings explored the flaws in Service accountability. Has the Service marched backwards? Remember Pinchot's 1906 declaration,

"We...have a very careful cost-keeping system and can tell you what any part of the work costs and how cost compares with actual work." [Hng. Approp.,FY '07, H. Com. on Ag. 59 Cong-1st, 1906 @ page 258]

His 1908 pitch for a $5,000,000 capital fund loan was to reach his goal of putting the Forests

> "on a business, income-producing basis." [60 Cong. 1st Sess. House Ag. Com. Hng on 1909 Budget @ page 162]

The 1906-08 reality is that despite Pinchot's promises, the Service ran -$1,806,800 in the red. The condition continued.

By 1913, with 165,500,000 acres, the grim fiscal picture was:

All Resources Receipts	$2.468 million mainly grazing, some timber.
Costs	$5.348 million
Net	-$2.880 million.

Pinchot was followed by Chief Graves, assisted by William Greeley, the next became Chief. Both promised profitable operations. Graves told Congress that he had found the road to profits. He displayed a map of the 163 Forests charting the year each would be profitable. Proof was that already 44 Forests recovered "local operating costs", thus he fore- cast that by 1918 111 Forests would be profitable; by 1938 145 Forests would recover "local operating costs", while 18 Forests, managed for protection, would never pay their way.

The 1912 timber sale "At Cost" Act set farmer sales at the cost to sell them timber for their own use. The Service arbitrary price was 2/3rds the commercial sale appraised price, as though these sales recovered costs, which few did. The law was repealed in 1962 at the request of the Service as not needed.

A long-standing Service claim is that it favors small business. In 1913 Graves began what became 30 years of over 50 large 10-25 year sales averaging over 3.0 billion board feet each. They were most of their little timber program. These sales, appraised at low prices, were designed to induce firms that had cut out in the Lake States and South to move West. A sale started an application had to be filed with the sale advertising cost. This implied a "first right" to buy. Applicants normally got sales at the advertised price.

The Service view was that their benign supervision assured sustained yield and permanent operations. Firms knew their dominant position protected them because it used most of the "allowable cut". Future sales would be at sealed bid, but buyers knew that first sale gave them control of later sales. This was largely the case

until the mid '50's. I looked at a job with the Mt. Whitney Co. on the Sequoia. Their annual report boasted control the Forest's timber. They didn't keep it. Operations closed in the '60's when competitors out bid them. They abandoned the company town and mill at Johnsondale, all funded by Sequoia timber.

As a Ochoco forester after WW II, sales were sold but trees were not marked until a few days before felling. We had no idea that we were violating the 1897 stipulation that only "dead, matured large growth of trees" could be sold and that all trees had to be marked BEFORE the sale was made. In 1911 Chief Graves told the Regions the "clean-cutting" was preferable to "any seed tree system". Ignoring the 1897 restrictions was a long standing practice.

On one sale we switched in mid-sale from mark 80%-leave 20% to mark 35% leave 65%. Only the best trees were marked. Low value trees, minor species and dead trees were left. Roads were laid out to the minimum to log that sale, far less than I'd done in my prior private forest job. Mainline roads for all uses were to a higher standard. K.V. collections were modest and used mainly to prune possible future pine crop trees. In Douglas fir, researcher Leo Isaacs, with difficulty, convinced Chief Watts that Burt Kirkland's "Zero-margin selection" Depression-spawned idea was creating a silvicultural disaster. The Service went from "high -grading" pseudo selection sales to "staggered settings" ranging from 40 to 160 acres instead of the larger Industry clearcuts. Reliance was on natural regeneration.

The cut rose logarythmically from the 1 billion board foot pre WW-II level to over 12 billion board feet in the 1960's. Sales weren't based on multi-resource goals, the agenda was driven by "getting out the cut". This was also true on the O&C lands where I worked.

In 1947 the Forest road system had 23,000 miles of Forest Highways on the "ABC" system and funded by the Federal Highway Act gas tax money. Another 100,000 miles of "Forest Development" roads, had been largely built by timber purchasers. These roads were funded by reducing timber prices by the estimated road cost. This was how logging railroads, splash dams and flumes on earlier sales were funded. The Service prices its timber based on their estimate of it's worth to the buyer - not on the Service's cost as a timber grower- manager. This is why Forest timber pays for the logging roads.

The 1947 mileage was 1/4 of today's 380,000 miles. The Chief said 47% of the 100,000 miles were unsatisfactory and 53% was serviceable. For decades this now 380,000 mile road system, mainly built by timber buyers but funded by Forest timber, has been a disaster in waiting. From 1987-'97, 11 years, 88% of this road work, 42,500 miles were rebuilt; 5,540 new timber road miles were added. In '97 8.9 miles were rebuilt for each new mile and for '98 it was 11.6 to 1. Roads built only to the standard needed for that sale and inadequate maintenance money are the twin errors. Those objecting to the road policy should look at the real problem. It is little wonder that a moratorium on new roads is needed.

NFMA came about because, in their infinite wisdom, the Service and Industry didn't realize that the 1972 Monongahela suit was filed in the 4th Circuit because Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth warned District Court Judges that Congress makes laws, not Courts. Former Chief McArdle told me that in 1952 Counsel Fred Mynatt told him the 1897 Act was being violated. Mac said he, "Decided to let sleeping dogs be". He was certain the Court would rule for the plaintiffs. Sen. Talmadge agreed. He had counsel McLeod and me draft a 1974 RPA section to permit any trees to be cut in a sound manner with marking when necessary. Both the Industry and the Service, sure that they would prevail in court, asked that the reform be dropped. It was. Two weeks later, when Judge Maxwell ruled against them, they ran back asking that the section be revived. Sen. Talmadge flatly declined, saying go to the Court of Appeals. The 1972 lesson was; obey the law. By the time of the Spotted Owl case the Service had forgotten that lesson.

The Forest Service has ignored RPA and NFMA requirements. NFMA at 6(k) directs it to forego timber cutting for up to 10 years on lands where the financial or silvicultural outcome is unsatisfactory. There's ample proof of the Service failure to do this in GAO's 95-237FS and 99 -24. GAO shows a 6 year $2 billion cash deficit, with 103 of the 109 Forests in the red. Matching dollars with volume cut, acres cut and jobs claimed shows that cost control and loss management is not on the Service "radar screen". Counting the 6 profit Forests, the per acre average loss jumps from $312 in 1992 to-$866 in 1997. My estimate is that the 1999 loss exceeds -$850 per acre cut.

The Bighorn lost -$ 94,130/acre in '96. The Mendocino is tops at a $542,669/acre '96 loss cutting 6,354 MBF cut from 7 acres - an unlikely yield of 907,714 BF/acre. Several Forests show timber cut but no acres cut in some years. The Carson cut 4,983 MBF in 1994 but no acres. Job claims are unrealistic. A 1995 Mendocino job cost taxpayers $315,623.

The Tongass 6 year loss was -$171,265,024 logging 45,004 acres to cut 1.419 billion board feet. The Service claims their cut supports 1,979 jobs. It doesn't reveal that each job cost the taxpayer $14,442. In contrast the Allegheny had a $33,104,780 cash profit logging 40,396 acres to cut 376,535 MBF. Its timber program sustained 831 jobs accounting for $6,640 of each worker's income. Both Forests have the same laws and policies. Why should the Tongass lose $171,000,000 while the Allegheny earns $33,000,000 toward budget solvency.

A management system would reveal faulty basic input data. The first step in loss management and cost control is accomplishment facts. GAO's reports confirm that not only are losses not controlled, but as troubling is that sale results are inaccurate. This is one reason for the Service creditability problems.

The much ballyhooed Timber Sale Program Information Reporting System, (TSPIRS), an accrual accounting, 4 years in gestation, gets flunking grades from GAO and the Inspector General. It never was issued until 6-8 months after a FY ended - well after budget decisions are made. This is of small moment since the Appropriations Committees never found TSPIRS useful. There's no 1998-1999 TSPIRS reports.

NFMA Section 6(l) requires the representative sample timber sale, planting and stand improvement costs. An Act of Congress isn't needed to track and evaluate task costs. 6(l) has never been used.

The Service, with deliberate zeal, avoids cost control and loss management systems. Other agencies, such as Food Stamps, have standards for eligibility and amounts to be awarded. Cost management isn't a foreign concept from which resource management should be exempt.

The 1974 RPA and 1976 NFMA provisions to improve public under- standing of agency programs are ignored. Annual Report were to be issued when the budget comes out, appears months later. The 1999 Report isn't out yet. Its content was to be organized to be more useful. This wasn't done. OTA's excellent 1990 & 1992 reports suggesting sound changes in information systems, is ignored. For example, Forest data should be reported by Forest instead of the hodge-podge of tables by Forest, State or Region. Informative data on the Road System, trends in the volume and value of timber sold and cut, recreation uses, the condition of range lands aren't either absent or not shown in ways that helps either managers or the public understand them.

No effective use was made of broadly representative Advisory Boards provided in NFMA. A major cause for the vitriolic confrontations over actions, perceived and actual, it is the Service's failure to utilize the

"advance warnings" that a truly representative group of citizens can provide. The Service continues private consultations with select groups. This fosters suspicions rather than improve relations with the diverse Service constituencies.

The Last 20 years Have Had Problems That Could Not Be Foreseen.

The '70's bidding boom was followed by the early '80's Recession. About 10 billion board feet under contract came back for 2 cents on the dollar under the 1984 Timber Bailout Act. Their redoing doubled sale costs. Some sales were caught in the Owl litigation. Reagan's OMB Dir. Stockman said this timber bailout cost the taxpayers $2.1 billion.

Then from 1984-1990, the cut ballooned to 81 billion board foot, 11.6 billion BF a year was cut from 6 million acres, averaging 857,000 acres yearly. This was a 57 year cutting cycle raised questions in the minds of critics over whether sustained yield was being violated.

The claim of the proponents of the suddenly spawned 1994 Salvage Rider that there was 15 billion board feet ready and in need of salvage was pure fiction. Service studies were clear that most was widely scattered annual mortality that could never be reached. Not even the pared down 4.5 billion board feet was sold. The 27 month Rider record was:

Offered	4.606 Billion Board Feet	
Sold	3.825 Billion Board Feet	
Industry Refused	0.781 Billion Board Feet	17% less than Offered
Industry Cut	2.773 Billion Board Feet	28% less than was sold

The cut figure is misleading. Part is from sales made before the Rider began and the uncut volume from sales made during the Rider's 27 months was never tallied. Also a significant volume sold was "green".

Promised Salvage profits became losses. Those who comprehend the Service timber business knew losses would result. The sponsor forecast:

Revenues	$620,000,000
Sale costs + County payments	$315,000,000
Profit Forecast	$305,000,000

GAO shows a FY 1995-1997 -$1.323 billion cash loss for all Service timber sales, green and salvage. A salvage profit was impossible. There has never been a full accounting of the volume sold versus volume cut, the price bid versus price paid, the 27 month costs, plus costs after the Rider expired to supervise removal of remaining uncut timber, costs for soil and watershed protection and reforesting cut over areas.

The sponsor boasted that a 4.5 billion Salvage program would create 22,900 new jobs. Service 1994 records show 76,164 timber jobs from ALL sales. At the end of FY 1996 they list only 61,396 jobs, a 14,768 job loss, 20% fewer jobs. Instead of a 24% job increase there were 32,668 fewer jobs than he forecast as the Salvage and Green sales fell by over 1 billion board feet.

For "crash programs" it would make sense, no matter how conceived, when they are done, to see if they

functioned as promised. The 1996 Interagency Salvage Program Review by NOAA-NFMA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, BLM and EPA, gives excellent insights and suggestions on how to run such a program but ignores financial aspects.

There is enough experience and evidence from post fire sales to avoid them when the outcome will add to resource degradation, even if there's no concern about financial losses.

The ill-conceived efforts to cripple the timber program by cutting Purchaser Road Credit (PRC) construction produced a law that says PRC is "prohibited". Those whose native language is English, know that PRC is still alive. The Service must reduce timber prices by the estimated road cost, use it to make county payments, build the roads for small firms, and all other long-standing PRC practices remain in place.

The timber sale reality GAO shows for 1992-97 is a 6 year $2 billion cash deficit, despite the overall Federal budget changing from multi-billion deficits to a hoped for surplus. The grazing program continues to cost far more than it brings in. Congress froze the fee at $1.35 per AUM. On a constant dollar basis the fee is lower than it was 50 years ago; less than a box of Cornflakes. The 1872 Mining Law remains. Only on Public lands can the mining industry can get valuable minerals plus the land at the bargain rate of $2.50 an acre. Recreation has grown in the variety of activities as more people use the Forests. It too costs more than is recovered. Those who argue for a "Fee Demo" ban before its utility is known irrationally say that because Congress subsidizes timber, mining and grazing, it should subsidize recreation.

The 35 million acre Wilderness System remains in constant contest. This is fueled by a Service 4 decade failure to inventory lands by cover types, so that their resources, economic potential, if any, and the ecologic significance of the present System and proposed additions is known. Sen. Jackson was right when he told a timber lobbyist 40 years ago that Wilderness makes one group "drool", the other "snivel".

The State setting the terms for fish and game taking on the Forests remains in place, with the Service expected to provide habitat, no matter the cost or what the State does. This won't change. Threatened and endangered species will generate debates over the best course.

The Service timber program fell 72% since 1990. Regional declines run from -85% to -27%. Acres cut have fallen an average of -54%, a regional range of -17% to -74%. Board feet cut per acre logged rose in 5 Regions but fell in 4 Regions. On average it fell -36% with a 9 Region range from + 20% to -66%. No explanation has ever been provided.

The number of years needed to cut over the 49,463,000 acres rated "Suitable For Timber Production" has increased from 48 years in 1990 to 110 years in 1999, with wide variations between Regions. Reg. 1 through 4 shifted from 24 to 75 years to 225 to 288 years. Regions 5 through 10, with ranges from 25 years to 55 years now run from 55 years to 110 years.

These rough indicators of trends need to be examined Forest by Forest before reaching conclusions. The cutting systems used affect volume cut per acre logged. The apparent "Rotation Years" may involve multiple entries on the same acres and may not depict the same result as clearcuts. These data show a huge change in every Region's timber program execution. Whether this is the future remains to be seen. These relations to the sustained yield mandate is never discussed.

	Reg. MMBF Cut	MBF Cut	Change	Acres Cut	Acres Cut	Change
	1990	1999	90-99	1990	1999	90-99

1	1,016	256	-75%	59,972	30,221	-50%
2	386	141	-73%	66,678	20,606	-69%
3	443	84	-81%	91,257	75,685	-17%
4	416	142	-66%	53,298	17,282	-68%
5	1,725	505	-71%	158,978	58,178	-63%
6	3,838	569	-85%	256,524	112,614	-56%
8	1,422	594	-58%	202,084	112,474	-44%
9	752	554	-27%	113,651	77,974	-31%
10	472	146	-71%	14,234	3,722	-74%
ALL	10,482	2,939	-72%	1,027,535	448,746	-54%

	Reg. Cut/Acre	Cut/Acre	Change	Rotation Years	
	B.F. 1990	B.F. 1999	90-99	1990	1999
1	16,394	8,486	-50%	24	288
2	5,791	6,859	0.18	75	244
3	4,887	5,330	0.1	39	225
4	6,490	8,205	0.2	69	254
5	10,850	8,683	-20%	35	96
6	14,963	5,056	-66%	25	57
8	7,036	5,258	-25%	41	74
9	6,616	7,103	0.07	55	80
10	33,139	39,267	0.18	48	110
ALL	10,202	6,548	-36%	48	110

Production Prices, Employment and Trade, 1998 PNW-RB-231, May 2000 has much useful information on the 6 Northwest States. Table 22 has the OR-WA forest industry. Table 23, 24 shows the CA, AK, MT and ID Industry. Table 25 shows OR-WA total jobs, SIC 24 jobs, wages, unemployment and total population, 1994-1998. Expanding tables to show the relation of the industry to total jobs in AK, ID, MT & CA would give useful insights into the role of their forest products sectors.

It shows that softwood lumber production fell about 3% since 1990 and prices have been soft. Southern output rose; Western output fell. The OR and CA lumber cuts dropped significantly; WA, ID, and MT were stable. Increased plywood production had a slight price gain. Western structural softwood panel production fell; the rise in Southern and Northern output more than compensated for the Western drop. Softwood log exports, long in contention in the PNW, remain slack, lumber exports are low and prices fell.

Those seeking a large National Forest cut often point out that it has 50% of the Nation's Softwoods. This is meaningless when you look at the cost to manage these lands as timber suppliers. It is likely that perhaps 10 million of the 49.5 million acres and 100 billion of its 953 billion board feet of softwoods can be marketed in an financial sensible manner. The National Forests are a small Hardwood player. Their 33 billion BF are

but 7% of the national supply but the Allegheny is a profitable producer.

In the major Forest Service timber sale zone, Washington-Oregon, timber jobs fell from 3.8% of the 3,395,000 all job 1994 total to 2.7% of 4,071,000 1998 jobs. These States created 20% more new jobs. The timber job 20,000 loss was more than offset by the 676,000 new jobs in other sectors. Based on covered jobs between 1994-1998 Oregon added 193,100 jobs while losing 4,100 timber jobs. 5 small timber counties lost total jobs and timber jobs. 12 of the 36 counties had more timber and more total jobs in 1998 than in 1994. Washington has the same pattern. Its economy boomed. Fisheries and timber are a challenge.

A comprehensive examination of the interactions of events in various regions and owners would provide a better basis for an informed judgment of the effects of private and public decisions.

You've explored events from the impacts of the Spotted Owl to the failure of the Forest Service to create a credible accounting program and your concerns over proposals to install a road moratorium.

What Will Be The Future Forest Service?

I'm cautious about forecasting when I reflect on how I thought resource management would evolve 50 years ago and what has happened.

The current budget surpluses dance like visions of sugar plums before the eyes of those whose dream is that these are forever. To them it spell tax cuts, more spending or both depending on one's outlook. The reality is that the "Past is Prologue". In 1953 the Debt was $275 billion. Pres. Reagan inherited a $930 billion Debt. Pres. Clinton inherited a $4.1 trillion Debt. Today's Debt is $5.672 trillion. The surpluses are being spent before they arrive. The Debt grows.

Most Forests will never be the "a paying proposition", Pinchot planned or Graves forecast. There is no sound reason for the commodity programs, especially, to run the uncontrolled losses they now have. The Service and Congress should work together to hold Forest commodity and noncommodity programs losses to reasonable levels.

Mounting energy costs are going to affect us in many ways. The SUV may be the last dinosaur. I won't matter what sort of birth control devices are invented. Even if the rate of population growth slows we are going to have more people using more resources, and putting more pressures on a finite land base. We will become more urbanized. A smaller percentage of people will work the forest, range, and farms. This disconnect with the land will increase frictions. I'm not sure how, as a people, we will cope with these pressures.

Many subsidies, timber and otherwise, will continue. The Service, often aided by Congress has been resourceful in avoiding reform. Some reforms it has tried, Congress has often sought to kill or killed.

The timber industry is important in Oregon and Washington. National Forest timber while vital will have a smaller role. Private land will play a larger timber role. This, in turn, will increase pressure for better environmental management.

Public land grazing use has been declining, but many cling to it as a way of life hard to give up. This use will continue to erode. Other feed sources are more efficient. Grazing's meat production role will fall.

The 1872 Mining Law has proven very hardy. While I think the time has long passed for a leasing system, I'm not betting on a change soon.

Much has been said about "forest health". The contention is that logging is the cure. The specter of the 3 horsemen of disaster, fire, insects and disease are cited. Wildfire burns more range land and brush land than timber land. With a growing population pressure on the range, woodland, forest interfaces, will require new strategies to target likely danger zones and find more cost effective and resource friendly treatments.

The Road System is a major problem. For 50 years construction and maintenance were driven by "back door" spending using timber as money. The reduced timber program has dried up this easy "off -budget" money. The tough issue is defining the network needed for the uses people make of these lands. There is no easy answer. The future Forests will have fewer miles and more managed road use unless Congress is content to have more roads that washout, damage fisheries, downstream resources and homes. Higher fuel costs will impact road and ORV use.

My guess is that recreation is going to be increasingly important. The variety and use will continue to expand. The more urban our society becomes, the more difficult it will be for that sector to understand the nuances of integrated resource management. The Service challenge will be to narrow the communication chasm.

There has been weak resolution about how public lands are "zoned" for use. The "either - or" approach has exacerbated controversy. The solution lies in funding good land capability inventories so that there will be a better Service and public understanding of the present and proposed land use designations that can be fostered. These combined with their review by truly representative citizen advisory boards, not all local people, could help. Land use decisions aren't permanent. Future generations will make their own determinations based on how they see the issues they face.

The roles that these 191 million acres should play in our society in relation to other similar lands has not been carefully evaluated. Part of the problem is that the Land Use Plans done under NFMA don't focus how their management and use affect Forest lands. The Plans often fail to show the Forest situation clearly.

Despite the criticism leveled the Committee of Scientists report, their work has many useful ideas on the role and scope that Plans should have. Planning will continue. But Plans need to be shorter and better focused.

Plans should be built from the ground up. Local Plan implementation will continue to be shaped by the Chief, Department, OMB, the President and Congress as they decide funding. Local control would work if all funds came from a local source. Funding is National. That's why there won't be local control.

The State and Private Forestry function remains overshadowed by the National Forests. The far larger private - state land base is diffuse. These lands are more capable of meeting commodity needs than public lands, but less suited to fulfilling some of the amenity roles that would require allowing the same level of public use of private land.

In the next few years it would be useful to better evaluate the roles that National Forest commodity production and the noncommodity uses in relation to those of the States and private sector. This is a role for RPA to fill reaching out to the private sector and the States.

The weakest link in the Forest Service structure is the small role assigned to Research. On a "constant dollar - number of researcher" basis the Service has less capability than it had 2 decades ago. Its importance is underestimated. The National Academy report on the need to expand research got scant attention. This condition deserves early correction.

When Senators Talmadge and Humphrey had me work on the 1974 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Act they recognized that each generation would chart the course they thought appropriate. Planning is an aspiration not a certainty. Their hope was that the iteration of each Plan would provide good "maps" that would help the next generation make progress; not lead to disaster.

I think each Chief, and his people, have tried to devise courses they thought were wise choices. Programs have been buffeted by external events. The Service also has been hurt by their own shortcomings. Top Executive and Congressional managers have not always recognized the way its decisions play on the ground. Where Congress could help it has sometimes stood back, and at other times it has interfered. When citizens don't get satisfaction from an agency or the Congress, they turn to the Courts. I don't see this changing soon. Each part of Government has its role, and guards it. At times roles conflict with what vocal parts of the public believe is desirable.

The U.S. Forest Service is a 3 part system, Research, State and Private Outreach, and Land and Resource Management.

My hope is that in the days ahead all branches of the Government will fashion better ways to help it assure the level and type of natural resource management the Nation needs for this Century. Will this happen? It has in the past. It could happen again.

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